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1 July 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Meeting of SANACC Subcommittee on
Psychological Warfare

1. The SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare met at 10:30 today in Mr. Block's office with the following members present:

Chairman - Mr. Ralph Block	- State Department
Comdr. David Knoll	- Navy Department
Colonel Rich	- Air Force
Colonel William McNamara	- Army Department
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2. In accordance with specific instructions from the Executive Director, CIA renewed its active membership with this Subcommittee today.

3. Mr. Block stated that by direction of SANACC, Mr. Lloyd Lehribus had replaced Mr. Tyler as Mr. Block's alternate on the Subcommittee. Both Commander Knoll and Colonel Rich were very active in throwing jibes and jabs at the CIA member, stating that the first point which should be considered was whether I should really be allowed to resume membership with the Subcommittee. Apparently the Navy interpretation of the memorandum written by Assistant Secretary Saltzman was that SANACC had recognized an official elimination of CIA's membership on the Subcommittee. My placid attitude through most of this period was, of course, quite aggravating to the funsters. When they got through, Mr. Block said that for the record an official statement should be made regarding CIA resuming active membership on the Subcommittee. The following is almost word for word the statement which I made: "The day before yesterday an official from high echelon within CIA directed me to resume attendance at meetings of this Subcommittee. I immediately called you, Mr. Block, informing you of this directive, and you told me that the next meeting was to be held today." Then Mr. Block asked me, "Please, informally, off the record, do tell us about the circumstances of your being absent and your being present with us again." I told him I had nothing to add to what I had previously told him over the phone and this morning.

OSD & DOS review(s) completed.

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4. Colonel McNamara stated that he had asked the Army staff on the NSC Staff as to when we might expect an official answer from the National Security Council on the paper which was submitted through SANACC. He, Commander Knoll and Colonel Rich, ably supported by Mr. Block, stated that they will not change their present procedures in the Subcommittee until "specifically" directed.

5. Commander Knoll and Colonel Rich were not at all too complimentary in their remarks regarding George Allen and his connection with the Voice of America, and they were most belittling in speaking about the work of Oechner's group. For example, Colonel Rich mentioned that his man from the NSC 4 Committee asked him yesterday for the Air Force policy on dissemination of information. Colonel Rich answered by asking what was Allen's national policy.

6. After such worth-while contributions to the security of our nation, the Subcommittee began its deliberations on the item scheduled for discussion today, viz.:

**U. S. NATIONAL POLICY OF DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
TO THE WORLD**

**REPORT BY THE
STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE COORDINATING SUBCOMMITTEE
FOR SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS**

(On Its Own Initiative)

The CIA member has a copy of this paper and would welcome Agency reactions before further discussion of this problem at the next meeting of the Subcommittee to be held Tuesday, 6 July 1948.

MEMBER, ICAPS

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**U.S. NATIONAL POLICY ON DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
TO THE WORLD**

**REPORT BY THE
STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE COORDINATING SUBCOMMITTEE
FOR SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS**

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THE PROBLEM

1. Based upon the studies of the SA-ABC Subcommittee to determine a national policy ~~for the use of mass communication media~~ ^{for the use of mass communication media} ~~the dissemination of truth and information to preserve the liberties of the people of the United States~~ ^{and to assist in the maintenance of international peace and security} in keeping with the United Nations Charter, to maintain international peace and security, and the principle that the use of armed force shall be only in the common interest.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States enunciated ^{the} fundamental governing principles of a free people.

3. The Charter of the United Nations, an integral part of United States foreign policy, is a reaffirmation of these principles of "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small," with an additional emphasis upon the fact that international peace and security can prevail

- 2 -

throughout the world through united strength.

4. In furtherance of these purposes, the United Nations Conference on "Freedom of Information" at Geneva, March 23-April 2, 1948, declared that "Freedom of Information is a fundamental right of the people, and is the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is dedicated, without which world peace cannot well be preserved", that freedom of information depended in addition to unrestricted means, an acceptance of and compliance with the obligations "to seek the facts without prejudice and to ^{on} ~~diffuse~~ knowledge without malicious intent"; and that "in order to prevent abuses of freedom of information, governments in so far as they are able should support measures which will help to improve the quality of information and to make a diversity of news and opinion available to the people".

5. Public Law 402 (80th Congress), enacted January 1948, is intended "to promote the better understanding of the United States among the people of the world and to strengthen cooperative international relations". The Secretary of State is authorized to provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures and other information media, and through information centers and libraries abroad.

Section 803 of the law provides that in carrying on activities which require the utilization of government property

- 3 -

and facilities, maximum use shall be made of existing government property and facilities.

6. A Report by the National Security Council on coordination of Foreign Information measures (NSC-4) states that the Secretary of State should be charged with formulating policies for and coordinating the implementation of all information measures designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of U.S. objectives and to counteract effects of anti-U.S. propaganda.

7. "Propaganda", "psychological warfare", are terms widely and variously used to the extent that their significance, meaning and intent has become diffused and their usage imprecise. In a larger sense, all public Acts of the Government in time of war have a psychological effect on the enemy. Factual information expressing the acts and policies of the U.S. government and the acts, life and purposes of the people of the United States as propaganda when it is disseminated to foreign peoples to influence attitudes in a direction favorable to the attainment of U.S. objectives and to counteract anti-U.S. propaganda.

8. The evil connotation that has developed around "propaganda" as used by a government in peacetime is due to the fact that the German and the Japanese governments used, and the USSR still uses "propaganda" as a subversive instrument, falsehood, innuendo, slander, libel, openly projected as fact in the name of the respective governments.

SECRET

- 4 -

9. American political theory rests upon the profound belief that the government of the United States and freely elected governments anywhere can be successfully conducted only by giving the people for whom government exists free and full access to factual truth; the opportunity for the development of opinion by presentation of factual information. The will to convert or factual truth, rather than subvert; the evangelical tradition, is one of the dominant factors in American history and social thought. It appears significantly in the political experience of the United States; conversion by a free inter-play of factual information and discussion. Conversion deals in truth; subversion in falsehood.

10. The practical result of this basic ideology in World War II was to make official United States war propaganda preponderantly factual information; information keyed to United States government policies, purposes, and acts, in conjunction with its Allies. This was "white" propaganda, disseminated through appropriate channels and appropriately coordinated with essential war activities and departments of the government.

11. The developments of world polity and world economy before, during and since World War II are evidence that future wars in which the United States may be engaged will be world wars and total wars; wars in which the role played by the civilian population will equal that of the armed forces. Propaganda weapons will be correspondingly important. Despite the experience of two wars, such weapons are still new to the United States government;

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- 5 -

their use and function are not thoroughly understood. There is need for a balanced program, including development of technical training and research which will provide a nucleus for the sudden transition to an effective wartime organization.

12. An analysis of the SANAGC Subcommittee's work to date (Annex I) discloses the problems pertaining to psychological warfare study awaiting solution; and emphasizes the need for a national policy for influencing foreign attitudes by informational means applicable to peace and war.

C O N C L U S I O N S

13. United States government wartime propaganda, as planned communication of information by appropriate media to influence peoples to understanding and acceptance of United States national objectives, and to influence events toward the termination of hostilities, is a justifiable instrument of American social and political policy. Within such a framework of principle, themes can be appropriately developed, based upon national objectives, which will effectively rationalize the past and provide a logical appreciation of future world probabilities from the standpoint of United States tradition and civilization; a major function of American propaganda in this context must be to give a convincing comprehensive picture of the present and of pending historical changes related to the ideological objectives of the American society, with reasonable expectancy of realization.

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- 6 -

14. A national policy is essential with respect to any establishment of the propaganda process; a national policy is of major importance if Departments and Agencies with related responsibilities are to determine those responsibilities, and the requirements therefor in the preparation of programs in support of the propaganda instrument.

15. The National Security Act of 1947 provides the necessary authority in an Agency for determining and enunciating such a national policy and to assign positive responsibility to Executive Departments: namely the National Security Council.

16. In the interest of national security, it is essential that there be established within the State Department and the Military Establishment a peacetime nucleus for effective employment of this instrument in a form suitable to peacetime and expeditious mobilization to a wartime unit.

17. Terminology descriptive of the instrument should be standardized in a form which will be acceptable to responsible Executive Departments.

18. Fundamental to such terminology and the policy by which the United States Government accepts the propaganda instrument as an important element in support of political and security policies of the Government, is a comprehensive, realistic appreciation of domestic and world conditions within which specific details of American propaganda can be developed. Such propaganda

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- 7 -

must be the end product, the expression in terms understandable to the peoples and states to whom it is projected, so that it will convey clearly both in the manner in which it is projected and in its content, the ideals which underlie American life: not only in relation to the American people themselves but also to all peoples and governments with which the United States is associated in a world comity.

19. The effective use of propaganda instruments by the United States Government in war requires:

- a. Substantiation of propaganda by the Executive and Legislative branches of government as an instrument to support U.S. objectives in war;
- b. Clarification of the basis, the source of U.S. major propaganda orientations, and an understanding of the inherent spiritual, moral and historical factors which make possible the use of this instrument;
- c. Statement of policy by which propaganda becomes a major instrument for the attainment of national goals;
- d. Definition of where a propaganda instrument fits organically in the structure of government;
- e. The source of its authority;
- f. The source of its policy in relation to political, economic and military objectives;
- g. Its relationships to other agencies;
- h. Agreement by agencies in the Government with major

SECRET

- 8 -

interests on the meaning and function of "propaganda", and its sub-divisional terminologies, and on the scope of these sub-divisions (psychological warfare, political warfare, "white" propaganda, "black" propaganda, etc.).

1. Clarification of jurisdictional responsibilities for policy, as goals of national purpose which propaganda can help to implement, and for operational functions.

1. Establishment of organizational measures, including training, in major agencies, in order to make psychological weapons immediately available at the outset of war.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

20. It is recommended that the enclosure, "U.S. National Policy on the Dissemination of Information to the World", restricted, together with these Conclusions, be approved by SANACC and be forwarded to the National Security Council for final action and appropriate dissemination to Departments and Agencies of the government.

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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NATIONAL POLICY ON DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ^{TO} THE CHIEF

PREAMBLE

The Government of the United States, determined to keep the liberties of mankind inviolate from enslavement and political subversion, and in order to insure international tranquility, promote the general welfare of the World, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves, the World Family of free Nations, and Posterity; fully recognizing in keeping with the United Nations Charter that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest; have resolved to combine the use of U.S. resources to spread and retain throughout the world an intelligent appreciation of liberty and the rights of man through full use of mass communication media.

MISSION

OUR MISSION IS accomplished by:

The planned use of any measure, exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of the peoples of the world in such a way as to support the accomplishment of our national aims in keeping with the United Nations Charter, with the following objectives:

- a. To assist in counteracting the deleterious influence of an ideology alien to the Western Democratic way-of-life;
- b. To sustain the morale of friendly groups in countries threatened with enslavement or political subversion;

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SECRET

- 2 -

g. To improve the morale of friendly nations and the attitudes of the peoples of the world toward the United States.

FUNCTIONS

In order to insure prompt and effective implementation of any measure through the use of U.S. mass communications media, the Department of State, supported by government departments, activities, and agencies, will employ fully all existing Government property and facilities in making the peoples of the world politically receptive to the Western Democratic way-of-life. The planned use of such measures includes:

a. Introduction within alien ideological populations, of such interests, habits of living, emotional attachments, forms of social or economic activity as are consistent with the principles of freedom and the rights of man.

b. The use of communication media to convert conscious belief or opinions held by alien ideological populations on points of contention or rivalry, and to carry the conviction as to the uselessness of warfare as an instrument to gain the national ends considered to be at stake;

c. The use of peaceful measures to create emotional response at variance with effective resistance to political conversion to a way-of-life consonant with liberty and respect for the rights of the individual.

d. The use of various means to expose the deception.

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SECRET

- 3 -

delusion, and confusion that are propagated by agents of an ideology alien to the Western Democratic way-of-life.

The public information and public relations sections of government departments are enjoined to support the Department of State in the conduct of foreign information programs.

In time of war or national emergency the public information sections of the National Military Establishment will be appropriately enlarged to support the accomplishment of national and military aims in accordance with plans prepared and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the policy guidance of the National Security Council.

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S E C R E T

STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE COORDINATING SUBCOMMITTEE
ON SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS

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STATUS REPORT

1 June 1948 - 30 June 1948

I - MEMBERSHIP OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

No change.

II - MEETINGS

a. During this period the Subcommittee held eight regular meetings.

III - CONSULTANT

a. At its regular meeting on 25 June the Subcommittee met with Mr. Wallace Carroll, former European deputy, U.S.O.W.I., for discussion.

IV - WORK IN PROGRESS

a. Brief of the Subcommittee work to date for submission to SANACC.

b. U.S. National Policy on Psychological Warfare (SSE 8 and 8/1).

c. Determination of the functions and resources of agencies within the Federal structure which could be utilized by NSIA.

d. Discussion of Emergency Measures (SSE 2, 2/1, 2/2, 2/3, and 2/4).

(1) Development of Policies outlined in SANACC 304 Series.

e. Legal problems attendant on establishment of NSIA.

f. Personnel policies relating to training, development of rosters and classification categories for NSIA.

g. Domestic operations and special activities (SSE 7).

h. To ascertain the resources and capabilities of the Departments of the Military Establishment, the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency and how their facilities can be made available to NSIA.

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1. Discussion of comments and recommendations of the
Legal Staffs of the Departments of the Military Establish-
ments and the Department of State.

RALPH BLOCK
Chairman

- 2 -

S E C R E T

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25 June 1948

STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE COORDINATING
SUBCOMMITTEE FOR SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Dr. Harold D. Laswell, Professor of Law, Yale University, before the SANAC Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluations

Special Meeting, 7 May 1948;
Regular Meeting, 28 May 1948

Dr. Laswell is a government consultant on Political Science and is recognized as a national authority on Propaganda Technique. He was invited to discuss training curricula for Psychological Warfare.

This summary is followed by a more extended presentation of his remarks.

SUMMARY

1. Two types of personnel will be required for P.W.:--
Group "A" - Policy Oriented individuals (officers & Govt. officials)
Group "B" - Skill specialists.
Group "B" can be trained or obtained; they include functional and territorial specialists. Functional specialists are required for
 - (a) Media (Radio, Movies, Stage, etc.)
 - (b) Analysts, Evaluators, Public Opinion Experts.
 - (c) Organizers with special administrative qualifications for handling the temperamental individuals needed for P.W.

The first attention in training should be given to "what is the common minimum indoctrination everyone in Group "A" must have?"

2. Dr. Laswell proposed the following as the Common Minimum indoctrination.

Basic Needs of Group "A" (Policy Oriented Personnel)

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- (a) Have a clear appreciation of U.S. ideology. Know and understand U.S. ideology as well as any Communist agitator or organizer. Know clearly the U.S. ideological perspectives with U.S. objectives for society and "what kind of world the U.S. wants?"
- (b) Have a world appreciation of significant international and national trends and how these trends are affecting U.S. long range objectives.
- (c) A world appreciation of future probabilities and how U.S. ideology will meet each probability.

3. There is a more plausible solution for U.S. ideology than there is for Marxism or Communism. It is intellectually possible to achieve U.S. aims. Top-grade political warfare is needed now.

4. Experimental seminars on P.W. should be encouraged in order to locate the individuals who understand the foregoing basic needs and who can present "in words" the answers to the problems. Such answers must be acceptable to U.S. political leadership. Discussions should center on, "problems of a freer society vs. totalitarianism".

5. Dr. Laswell was very convincing that a P.W. agency required experts who understood U.S. ideology and had special qualifications for explaining it to others. The Subcommittee adjourned to consider Dr. Laswell's suggestions at a later meeting.

S E C R E TPRESENTATION

Referring to the two major groups of personnel required for Psychological Warfare -- policy personnel and skilled specialists -- the question posed by Dr. Laswell was: "What needs to be done to accomplish training by special educational media directed by responsible persons?"

"Most skills", he said, "exist in our society; training in the use of instruments of power. But there is no minimum flow of indoctrination of orientation, and such minimum indoctrination for psychological warfare is required by everyone from top to bottom."

"If this is clear as a general posing of the problem", Dr. Laswell said, "I think that it emphasizes the point that the educational program needs to be guided by an inventory of the existing flow of specialist and policy people that fit the bill. I think that we would all agree that, at the present time, there is no minimum orientation that is generally shared throughout the government and private agencies. I think we would all agree that most of the jobs of skilled specialization are being taken care of by the organized activities of our society. The basic job of this education program is to figure out how to transmit the minimum orientation. What basic way do we need? On this I would say the answer is that we need people who are as clear about our ideologies as any produced by our potential enemies. This means that we need to devise an educational experience which will clarify our objectives as a society. What kind of a world do Americans want? We need to be as clear as we can on the answer to that question; we need to have a world view of historic trends affecting these objectives and a world view of future potentialities.

"When we meet a well instructed communist, we have all doubtless been impressed by the fact that we have taken our

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own ideology for granted, and there is likely to be a little fumbling; it is quite likely to dissolve in a testimony meeting. Our problem and our job is to get people lined up who understand the first objective of our society, which is a relatively easy thing to deal with; where Americans are sadly lacking is in a world view of trends and possibilities, which is not the sort of thing we are likely to get in our schools and colleges. One of the great problems we have in political education at this level for psychological warfare is to clarify for people the significant historic trends of this epoch and the potentialities as they affect the future - to work it out so that we are competently prepared to deal with each one of the competing ideologies that we may meet and reject. The Marxian point of view purports to give a comprehensive picture of our time and of the pending historic changes. A skillful person can present this in such a way as to seem to give a plausible account of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and a plausible forecast of the future. If we are going to meet these people as intellectual superiors, we have to have a more comprehensive picture of world historic events involved in the view of where the world is taking us. Do we, at the present time, have the resources of personnel and ideas to do that job? I would put a very high priority in terms of the equipment of our policy oriented people on training situations where trainees can receive this kind of orientation. Once you have a sense of what the trends are and why it is that it is plausible for us not only to espouse our worthy purposes but to have a strong chance of putting them across, you have a foundation for policy orientation courses.

"What are the moral purposes that we are interested in? What does America look like to an outsider? How is it possible to clarify our purpose as clearly as possible and to clarify the probability that it will win over any other point of view? We must be in a better position than any potential opposition to the American point of view to clarify our trainees on these points."

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S E C R E T

In the Subcommittee discussion, the question was asked whether our higher education will produce any quantity of the individuals needed for these purposes. Dr. Laswell replied that while our colleges are turning out good material; so far as the world situation is concerned they are still doing a rather meagre job. People have been caught up in the nineteenth century process of being specialized more and more on tiny problems. The President's Committee on Higher Education was supposed to do something along this line but Dr. Laswell confessed to reservations about the possibility of any committee of educators doing the job effectively. What we are concerned with is the moral basis of our policy. Unless one is individually clearly equipped with the tools to do this sort of thing, or to find the people who will do it, Dr. Laswell feels we would be working with an unnecessary handicap. The problems of psychological political warfare that are interesting to an alert mind are the problems of a free society in competition with an unfree society. The American point of view is that you need a lot of diversity and structure in order to keep a balance. In approaching this problem, the great need is for experimental seminars to find out who is adaptable to this job.

In his second discussion, Dr. Laswell pointed out that psychological warfare is only valuable if it is part of an integrated set of operations, integrated with the instruments of destruction, economy and diplomacy: a coordination of words, weapons, goods, and deals. In order to provide an approach to instruction from this point of view, there is a great need of case materials expressly to show past situations and hypothetical futures. These should be prepared by people who can obtain such case materials by effective interviews; competent people who can ask the right questions. No model case studies of this kind are now in print. For instance, such studies should, in relation to psychological warfare, provide background material on the period up to invasion, the actual invasion and successive phases

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of liberation. Information on these aspects has not yet been directly obtained. The current trend is to prepare each one of these operations in relation to the whole. After such case materials have been provided, a method of approach can be decided - such as, chalk talks, movies and so forth.

Dr. Laswell indicated that an off the cuff estimate - "my hunch" - would be that a thorough interviewing job of relevant people, plus necessary reading and travel would take one good researcher about three months.